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Abstract in English 
Using the CGE model WorldScan, we assess the benefits for the EU member states of jointly 
reaching four of the Lisbon targets (i.e. 70% employment, skills upgrades, increased R&D 
expenditures and administrative burden reductions of 25%), compared with the alternative when 
each country unilaterally pursues these reforms. With this approach, we estimate the associated 
international spillovers of joint EU coordination. Spillovers associated with R&D expenditures 
are a key factor. When the R&D target is jointly reached in the EU, output almost doubles and 
consumption experiments an even greater increase. The other three targets also produce positive 
spillovers, but of a much lower magnitude. 
 
Key words: International Policy Spillovers, CGE models, R&D spillovers 
JEL code:  F42, C68, O33 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Wij evalueren de voordelen voor de EU-lidstaten om gezamenlijk vier Lissabon-doelstellingen 
te halen (de werkgelegenheidsdoelstelling van 70%, een verbetering van de vaardigheden, 
O&O-uitgaven tot 3% van het BBP, en een 25% vermindering van de administratieve lasten). 
De uitkomsten worden vergeleken met de situatie waarin de landen deze hervormingen alleen 
doorvoeren. We maken gebruik van het toegepaste algemeen-evenwichtsmodel WorldScan. 
Met deze benadering bepalen we de spillovers van gezamenlijke coördinatie in de EU. 
Spillovers die gerelateerd zijn aan O&O, zijn cruciaal. Als de O&O-doelstelling gezamenlijk 
wordt gehaald is de toename van productie twee maal zo hoog als wanneer landen deze 
doelstelling alleen bereiken. Het verschil in de consumptietoename is nog groter. Voor de 
andere drie doelstellingen zijn er ook positieve spillovers van gezamenlijk beleid, maar deze 
zijn veel minder groot.  
 
Steekwoorden: Internationale beleidsspillovers, algemeen-evenwichtsmodel, O&O-spillovers 
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1  Introduction
1 
A stronger emphasis on job creation and economic growth is one of the main conclusions of the 
midterm review of the Lisbon strategy. It is one of the top priorities of the Barroso presidency 
of the European Commission together with more emphasis on implementation of the Lisbon 
Agenda through national action plans. The Sapir (2003) and Kok (2004) reports constitute 
important analytical building blocks underlying the mid-term review. Nevertheless, several 
questions remain unanswered, such as to assess the benefits of coordinating these reform 
policies in Europe.  
There are several reasons why the member states want to act together. Countries could learn 
from each other, joint efforts are stimulating to carry on reforms, coordination could overcome 
national resistance against reforms, or joint efforts could increase the benefits from reforms. We 
focus in this last reason. Thus, the central question of this study is to assess the benefits for the 
EU member states of jointly reaching the Lisbon Agenda, compared with the alternative when 
each country unilaterally pursues these reforms.  
Do structural reforms in products and labour markets in one member state cause an 
externality?
2 Do other member states benefit from reforms and higher growth in one member 
state? This externality is not entirely obvious. Does a member state in which factors are fully 
employed, benefit from higher growth elsewhere in Europe? Or, the other way around, is it 
possible for the smaller EU countries to grow fast when large members postpone reforms and 
follow a trajectory with historically low growth? These questions are central in this study.  
To estimate the spillovers associated with joint action in the EU, we assume that member 
states reach the Lisbon targets. We focus, however, in four policy objectives: reaching the 70% 
employment target, several skills targets (less early school leavers, more graduates from 
secondary education and in mathematics, science and technology, increased reading literacy, 
and more lifelong learning), the 2.7% R&D expenditure target, and less administrative burdens 
on companies. We focus on these objectives for various reasons. First, the employment target 
represents the jobs pillar of the strategy. Second, on the productivity growth pillar, R&D comes 
to the fore, because it is an important input in innovation and it has high social returns. Third, 
human capital, as a factor of production directly contributes to productivity growth. Fourth, 
reducing administrative costs contributes to higher growth levels by increasing competition and 
smoothing the functioning of markets. Hence, this range of applications covers the main fields 
of the Lisbon strategy.   
The interactions between these Lisbon policies and the rest of the economy are complex. 
The effects of reaching a Lisbon target can only be meaningfully considered by taking account 
of these interactions. Some of these interactions will reduce the initial effects of Lisbon policies, 
 
1 This paper is an offspring of the project International Spillovers of Domestic Reforms, carried out within the Framework 
Service Contract B2/ENTR/05/091 – FC of the European Commission. A summary of the results is published in EC (2007). 
2 This question was also recently addressed by Sapir (2007) at a recent meeting of a working group of the Economic Policy 
Committee on the evaluation of the Lisbon reforms.   8 
while others will enforce the effects. Hence, it is only feasible to take all these interactions into 
account within a formal analytical framework in the form of an economic model: a 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy. In particular, we use 
WorldScan, the CGE model developed at CPB (Lejour et al., 2006).  
To assess the magnitude of the spillovers associated with the Lisbon policies, we compare 
the WorldScan simulation outcomes for the cases that all member states conduct Lisbon 
policies simultaneously; with respect to the outcomes when a single member state conducts 
these policies unilaterally. Using this approach we assess the benefits from coordination for 
each individual member state. We do this exercise for each of the four Lisbon policies aimed at 
increasing employment and productivity. In addition, we analyse the importance of the various 
inter-country linkages. The study identifies the channels, the magnitude and the distribution 
across member states of the potential spillovers.   
Some economists
3 claim that labour market reforms and product market reforms are 
complementary. Are there spillovers between one type of policy and the impact of the other 
type of policy? We provide an analysis of the potential complementarities and also assess the 
synergies between the different policies.  
The main finding of the study is that the spillovers associated with R&D expenditures are 
the key factor behind the joint implementation of EU policies. Not only are the spillovers 
associated with R&D expenditures the largest, but also R&D is the main channel from which 
the other three policies spill over between member states.  
When the R&D target is jointly reached in the EU, output almost doubles and consumption 
experiments an even greater increase. The new member states (NMS) experience significant 
gains from increased R&D, not only because they are expected to make the biggest R&D 
expenditure increases, but also because they experience large spillovers of joint EU action. 
However, the spillover effects of R&D are also substantial in small member states (e.g. 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Portugal), where the spillovers are bigger than the 
output gains when each country acts alone. 
For the other three analysed Lisbon policies the spillovers are also positive, but of a much 
lower magnitude. Reaching these targets jointly in the EU, on average increases output and 
consumption by less then 6% according to our simulations. The results, however, vary much 
between member states. Usually smaller countries and NMS benefit most.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a short literature review on 
international spillovers and complementarities of domestic reforms. Section 3 explains in detail 
the four chosen Lisbon targets and how we assume they will be implemented and which 
associated costs are taken into account. We then explain how these policies are modelled in 
WorldScan in Section 4 and in the following section we present the economic outcomes of the 
simulations. Section 6 analyses the benefits for the EU of coordinated action. We conclude in 
Section 7. 
 
3 Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.   9 
2  International spillovers and complementarities of 
domestic reforms 
In this section, we overview the literature on international spillovers and consider the 
mechanism through which domestic reforms may spill over to other countries. In addition, we 
also survey the literature that analysis the potential complementarities between different 
domestic reforms. 
2.1  International spillovers 
The literature that studies the quantitative importance of policy spillovers between countries has 
mainly focused on fiscal policy and R&D spillovers. Few studies deal with the spillovers of 
other economic policies. However, the presence of such international spillovers is crucial to 
decide if coordinated economic policies between countries are necessary. 
Following the work by Coe and Helpman (1995), it is well established that the spillovers in 
R&D are positive and significant.  In their influential study they find high rates of return of 
R&D; both for domestic output, as well as for the international spillovers. In addition, the 
spillovers are positively associated with trade openness.  
On the other hand, the most studied case is that of fiscal spillovers, especially within the 
European Monetary Union.  Beetsma et al. (2006) find significant spillovers of fiscal policies 
within the EU through changes in trade. For example, if Germany increases public spending by 
1% of GDP then foreign exports rise 2.2%. However, other studies find that these fiscal 
spillovers can be negative in some cases, particularly in the short run, see Gros and Hobza 
(2001) and In’t Veld (2004).  
Concerning other economic policies, Bayoumi et al. (2003) find significant spillovers to the 
US when market reforms are undertaken within the EU to increase competition in the internal 
market.  In their study, the benefits to the US are provided by terms of trade gains. 
International spillovers are of special relevance for the EU. Increased cross-border 
integration and the existence of common institutions increase both the gains and the scope for 
coordination of national economic policies. When international spillovers are present, the 
principle of subsidiarity can by applied to shift decision powers to the EU level (see Ederveen et 
al., 2006).  Thus, assessing the quantitative importance of economic policy spillovers can 
provide information about the need to coordinate policies within the EU.   10 
2.2  Complementary of labour market and product market reforms 
Another interesting issue is that some economists claim that labour market reforms and product 
market reforms are complementary. Are there spillovers between one type of policy and the 
impact of the other type of policy? We will provide an analysis of the potential 
complementarities.  
Recent economic studies have found complementarities between labour market and product 
market reforms (PMRs). Surveying this literature, one can distinguish three main channels. 
First, PMRs can directly affect employment levels. Nicoletti et al. (2001) find that the product 
market regulatory environment can account for a deviation of up to 3 percentage points of the 
employment rate from the OECD average.  
Secondly, there is evidence of synergies between both types of reform. Theoretically, the 
effectiveness of labour market reforms (LMRs) can be dampened by high product market 
regulations that constraint labour demand. Accordingly, PMRs can be limited by a regulated 
labour market with a low elasticity of labour supply (Berger and Danninger, 2005). The 
empirical evidence largely confirms these interactions. Using OECD panel data, Berger and 
Danninger (2005) find that low levels of regulation in the product and labour market are 
associated with higher employment growth. OECD countries with average regulation levels that 
move to low regulation levels stand to gain about 1 percentage point in annual employment 
growth. This sizable effect is partially due to the interaction term between both reforms. Griffith 
et al. (2007) conclude that product market deregulation by some OECD countries in the nineties 
is associated with increases in aggregate employment and the real wage. For countries with a 
higher level of collective bargaining the employment effects are more pronounced and the real 
wage effect less so. 
Finally, there are political economy complementarities between reforms. PMRs can 
facilitate the implementation of LMRs. This can be achieved by increasing the effectiveness of 
the LMRs (as discussed above) or by reducing the opposition to these reforms. For instance, if 
PMRs reduce the rents associated with certain activities, then labour unions will have fewer 
incentives to benefit from those rents. The IMF (2004) finds strong interactions between both 
reforms with some evidence that PMRs lead to later LMRs, but not vice versa.  Estevão (2005), 
for example, concludes that the overly regulated product markets in the Euro area are 
undermining the effects of labour market reforms. In a dynamic setting, Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) emphasize the importance of a sequential structural reform, where PMRs are 
implemented before LMRs. 
It is not clear that the complementarities mentioned above can easily be quantified in an 
applied general equilibrium model. In WorldScan, for example, the unemployment rate is 
exogenous.  However, for each target simulation we discuss the associated spillovers and 
synergies in light of the existing literature. The overall analysis of the results obtained should 
lead to, at least tentative, policy recommendations.   11 
3  The Lisbon Strategy: domestic reform policies in the EU 
The study analyses in particular the spillovers associated with the following four Lisbon policy 
targets: 
 
·  Skills upgrading. Assuming that several skills targets are attained: less early school leavers, 
more graduates from secondary education, and from mathematics, science and technology, 
increased reading literacy and more lifelong learning. 
·  R&D targets. Reaching a 2.7% R&D expenditure share of GDP, as announced by EU member 
states in the 2006 Spring Council. 
·  A decrease in administrative burdens on companies. Assuming a 25% reduction in 
administrative burdens by 2012 as suggested by the European Commission in its Action 
Programme. 
·  The employment target. Supposing that EU member states reach the Lisbon 70% employment 
target. 
 
The productivity policies will be a mix of three policies: increasing skills, increasing R&D 
expenditures and reducing the administrative burden. Reaching the employment target will be a 
mix of two policies: increasing labour-market participation and lowering unemployment. 
The European Commission (2004) emphasises that the skills targets apply to the EU as a 
whole and not to individual countries. In accordance, we follow the general rule to compute 
country specific targets for all four simulations. We set an upper limit above the specific target 
and above the highest base level value (sometimes countries already in the base data exceed the 
specific target). We then set the target for a country proportional to the distance of the base 
level value of that country and the upper limit. In this way countries that are at the largest 
distance from the target have to make the largest effort. At the same time, because the upper 
limit exceeds the target, countries that have reached or exceeded the target are still assumed to 
make some -although generally small- effort. 
To assess how each target will be reached and the main costs involved with such policies, 
this study follows closely on Gelauff and Lejour (2006). For the four Lisbon targets, Gelauff 
and Lejour have derived time paths for the Lisbon targets. We follow these time paths - with 
only minor changes for the employment target, as explained below. Moreover, we also apply 
the  ‘lower bound’ case where the elasticity of domestic and foreign total factor productivity 
(TFP) to changes in R&D stock, is on 25% of the estimated elasticities.   
The current study, however, has some new and distinct features. In particular, it introduces 
imperfect competition and uses the recently compiled trade in services data documented in van 
Leeuwen and Lejour (2006).  
When modelling the Lisbon strategy, we do not explicitly deal with the policies required to 
reach the targets. Nevertheless, some simulations still capture relevant costs of achieving the    12 
targets. The following sections analyse each target separately, and in some cases, the relevant 
costs involved. 
3.1  Skills 
As part of the Lisbon process, the Barcelona summit of 2002 endorsed common objectives for 
education and training in Europe. The May 2003 Council agreed on five targets (European 
Commission, 2004b) by 2010:  
 
·  An EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers should be achieved.  
·  At least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper secondary 
education or higher. 
·  The percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European Union should 
have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000. 
·  The European Union average level of participation in lifelong learning should be at least 12.5% 
of the adult working age population (the age group between 25-64 years old).  
·  The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) in the European 
Union should increase by at least 15% by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender 
imbalance should decrease. 
 
To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and training, Jacobs (2005) 
developed a  model, which incorporates various aspects of skill-formation needed to simulate 
the targets. The model contains stylised cohorts to compute the impact of reaching the targets in 
2010, on the skill structure of the labour force in the period 2010-2040. It takes many years 
before the skill structure of the labour force has adjusted to the higher educated cohorts that 
leave formal education. The model calculates a time path of the increase of labour efficiency 
reaching the skill targets in 2010. This reduction in the population of working age and the 
progressive increase in labour efficiency is subsequently inserted in WorldScan, which 
computes the general equilibrium effects of these education and training policies.  
To get some idea of the extra costs involved in schooling by the government we used the 
time inputs in Jacobs (2005). For target 2 and 5 extra time for schooling is needed. The 
completion of upper secondary education needs extra schooling years and the same holds for 
the increase for student in math and sciences, because in general these studies require an extra 
year of schooling compared to studies in arts.  For target 4 of lifelong-learning, we assume this 
is mainly on the job learning so no extra costs for teaching are required. Also for decreasing 
illiteracy we assume that no extra education costs are required because pupils do not stay for a 
longer time period at school. Of course it could require extra costs due to specialized teaching, 
but we do not take this into account. Data are hard to come by to estimate these extra costs and 
we guess that we overestimate the costs for the two other targets, 2 and 5.   13 
Table 3.1 present the relative increase in schooling years in 2010 needed to fulfil the Lisbon 
skills targets. Ignoring fixed costs in schooling it is possible to estimate the extra government 
costs for teaching and school buildings by relating  the average increase in schooling years to 
the average costs in schooling. Because we do not have recent and accurate data on costs per 
student, our rough estimate is based on total government expenditures on schooling as a share 
of GDP. 
Table 3.1  Extra schooling years and government spending 
Countries  Relative increase in 
schooling years 
Government spending in 
education (% of GDP) 
Increase in government 
spending (% of GDP) 
       
EU  2.99  5.2  0.16 
       
Austria  0.93  5.5  0.05 
Belgium  3.64  6.1  0.22 
Czech Republic  0.21  4.5  0.01 
Germany  1.16  4.7  0.05 
Denmark  1.28  8.3  0.11 
Spain  5.86  4.3  0.25 
Finland  2.61  6.4  0.17 
France  6.36  5.9  0.38 
UK  2.84  5.4  0.15 
Greece  4.83  3.9  0.19 
Hungary  0.45  5.9  0.03 
Ireland  5.36  4.4  0.24 
Italy  2.06  4.7  0.10 
The Netherlands  2.93  5.1  0.15 
Poland  2.38  5.6  0.13 
Portugal  8.43  5.6  0.47 
Slovakia  0.97  4.3  0.04 
Slovenia  1.51                                           6   0.09 
Sweden  2.54  7.5  0.19 
       
Rest EU 27  1.44  4.7  0.07 
 
Sources: column (2): Jacobs (2005); column (3): Eurostat 2003 data; column (4) own estimates 
 
On average, schooling increases from 12.3 to 12.5 years in Europe, which is about a 3% rise. 
Since government expenditure on schooling is 5.2% of GDP on average, then government costs 
increase by 0.16% of GDP if the target is reached in 2010. In time, it is expected that 
expenditure on schooling will decrease because the number of pupils and students will drop due 
to ageing. Based on the demographic patterns, we reduced the share of government spending on 
education in GDP. This last pattern, in turn, reduces the increase in costs associated with 
achieving the skills targets. Ideally we should use marginal costs on education instead of 
average costs. Given the existence of fixed costs in education, the numbers in table 3.1 are 
probably an upper bound.   14 
3.2  Less red tape in Europe 
Firms often complain about the time and costs involved to deal with administrative activities. 
To implement the reduction of administrative cost in WorldScan we assume that these costs 
largely consist of wages for workers that firms need to hire to comply with government 
regulations and to provide the government with information. Reducing the administrative 
burden implies that some of these workers can contribute directly to production. The reduction 
therefore takes the form of an increase in labour efficiency: fewer workers are needed, while 
production is not affected directly. Furthermore, we assume that the cost reduction is achieved 
by making the administrative process more efficient; it does not undermine government 
regulations. 
The Netherlands is one of the very few countries, which currently has detailed information 
on the administrative burden of government regulations. For 2002, the administrative burden in 
the Netherlands is equivalent to 3.7% of GDP (of which about 40% is due to EU regulation) and 
is projected to fall with 25%, e.g. with 0.9% of GDP. Therefore, we use the key figures for the 
Netherlands as a benchmark for the other member states of the European Union. To arrive at a 
meaningful international comparison Kox (2005) combined the Dutch data on the total 
administrative burden with the Djankov et al. (2002) data on inter-country differences in firm-
start-up costs to obtain estimates of the administrative burden per country. 
In WorldScan the reduction in the administrative burden is introduced in the form of a 
labour efficiency shock suggesting that the burden or administrative regulation depends on sales  
3.3  Research and Development  
Research and Development (R&D) is a key factor for technological change, and consequently 
economic growth. New technologies can boost productivity and raise incomes. Amounting to 
2% of GDP in 2003, public and private R&D expenditures are lagging behind in Europe 
compared to the United States (2.8%) and the rest of the OECD (3.1%). The EU member states 
proposed to raise these R&D expenditures in their national action plans from 1.9% in 2004 to 
2.7% of GDP in 2010. In the WorldScan simulations we assume that the targets are reached in 
2010.
4 We do not claim that this assumption is realistic. In particular, for the new member states 
current R&D expenditures are less than 1% percent. It is very difficult to increase these 
expenditure levels substantially within a few years and to attract or train sufficient researchers 
in such a relatively short period of time. 
It is well established that investment in R&D generates international spillovers: R&D in one 
country has an external effect on productivity in the country itself as well as for its trading 
partners. Therefore, we incorporate an empirical relation between total factor productivity 
 
4 For some countries, these targets are reached in other years: Greece in 2015, Ireland in 2013, Poland in 2008, and the UK 
in 2014.   15 
(TFP) growth and the growth of R&D stocks in WorldScan. We distinguish three types of R&D 
stocks: the R&D stocks of the own sector, of other sectors in the economy to reflect domestic 
spillovers, and of foreign sectors to reflect international spillovers. In addition, we have 
incorporated the R&D decision of firms in our model based on profit maximisation.  
We take account of some of the policy costs of achieving the R&D target by using a national 
R&D subsidy to reduce the investment price for R&D. This probably underestimates the costs 
for two reasons. First, we assume that the subsidy is spent effectively leading to more R&D 
expenditure. The literature suggests this is not the case, a part of the subsidies carry a 
deadweight loss. Second, the subsidy is paid by a lump-sum transfer from the domestic 
households in WorldScan. In practice, most taxes are proportional such as the income tax, so we 
abstract from the excess-burden of proportional taxes.  
The estimated TFP equation in WorldScan expresses the impact of a marginal increase in 
R&D. The 50% increase to meet the Lisbon target is not a marginal increase at all. Hence, we 
may doubt whether the extra R&D is as productive as current R&D. For these reasons, the 
elasticities of TFP to R&D stocks are calibrated such that the social rate of return on R&D 
equals the lower bound of the estimates in the literature (Jones and Williams, 1998).
5   
To take country differences into account, we cover proportionally the gap between current 
R&D spending and the country-specific target by increasing R&D expenditure between 2005 
and 2010. Countries with initially less spending on R&D have to increase their R&D effort 
substantially, while countries with initially high R&D spending face less ambitious targets.  
Since countries face different initial values and proposed targets, the overall effects of 
increased R&D spending can differ substantially and because of several factors. To simplify the 
analytical interpretation of these results, we conduct an additional exercise were R&D 
expenditure is increased by 20% - for all countries- with respect to the 2010 baseline values. 
3.4  Employment policies 
A very important goal in the ‘jobs and growth’ strategy is the employment target. It is set at 
70% in 2010, which implies that 70% of the population between 15 and 64 aged should have at 
least a part-time job. The employment policies will be a mix of two policies: increasing labour-
market participation and lowering unemployment. In previous work for the commission CPB 
has derived time paths for the targets on labour-market participation and unemployment for 
each member state such that in 2010 the 70% employment rate goal is met (see Gelauff and 
Lejour, 2006).  
The difficulty in obtaining this target depends on the baseline. In 2005, the employment rate 
was about 64% and is expected to increase even without specific Lisbon policies because of 
increased participation of women and elderly at the labour market. With respect to 
unemployment we use a recent baseline from NiGEM (Barrell and Kirby, 2007). This baseline 
 
5 In the Appendix, we present the results when the upper bound elasticities of TFP to R&D are employed.   16 
starts at 2006 with unemployment at around 7.4 percentage points, and over the first 7 years 
takes account of both a slow return to equilibrium output and employment from the current 
situation where there may be some spare capacity. Unemployment slowly trends downwards on 
the baseline because of the impacts of policies, such as the Hartz reforms in Germany that are 
currently implemented. This would still leave EU unemployment at around 6.5 percentage 
points in 2025. This is not sufficient to meet the employment target, labour market participation 
has to be increased as well. 
We have simulated an employment scenario with increasing participation rates for women 
and elderly workers and less unemployment. The 70% employment target has to be reached on 
average in the EU. To derive country-specific targets, we set an upper limit for the employment 
rate of 75%. Each country will proportionally reduce the gap between the maximum of 75% and 
the 2003 rate. This implies that a country with a low employment rate, such as Poland, still 
faces a very ambitious target, but it will be lower than 70%. Countries that already have met the 
70% target also increase employment to some extent. For the years after 2010 we assume that 
the unemployment rates and the age-specific labour-market participation rates per gender stay 
constant.   17 
4  The WorldScan model and the international spillovers 
channels 
The analysis will be based on the CPB WorldScan model (Lejour et al., 2006). WorldScan is a 
multi-sector, multi-region Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model. It is developed to 
study long-term global issues, such as globalisation and climate change policy. The model 
builds upon neoclassical theory, has strong micro-foundations and solves for the equilibrium 
that maximizes welfare across the entire economy, subject to technological constraints and 
budget constraints, among others. For this particular application, the basic version of 
WorldScan is extended with endogenous R&D decisions and spillovers, and with imperfect 
competition. 
In WorldScan we deal primarily with four spillovers mechanisms: R&D, terms of trade, 
export demand and capital market spillovers (Lejour and Tang, 2004). When the country 
increases its production and exports, it is expected to observe losses in its terms of trade vis-à-
vis its trading partners. However, if the export increase is simultaneously experienced by most 
trading partners -as is expected to occur in member states after a joint EU policy reform-  then 
the terms of trade do not deteriorate as much as with a unilateral reform. Therefore, there is a 
positive spillover associated with this channel. Closely related, when a country grows it 
increases its export demand and this benefits its trading partners, creating positive international 
spillovers. 
On the other hand, there is a negative spillover mechanism through the capital markets. The 
production shock can be transmitted to other countries through an increase in the international 
interest rates. However, if capital markets are relatively well integrated, then it will be easier to 
absorb the production shock and downplay the negative spillover associated with higher interest 
rates.  
Finally, R&D expenditures in one country can transmit positive spillovers to other countries, 
in particular when both economies are close trading partners. These conclusions are based on 
the literature that followed the influential study by Coe and Helpman (1995), which was 
discussed above. The particular mechanism through which R&D spillovers are endogenously 
determined in WorldScan is explained in Gelauff and Lejour (2006) and Lejour et al. (2006).  
To summarize this mechanism, for each country the growth in sectoral TFP is associated 
with the overall R&D stock of that country and its trading partners. The specific elasticities for 
each region follow econometric estimations of the relationship between these R&D stocks and 
TFP growth. The costs of increasing R&D expenditures are modelled with a governmental 
subsidy to the rates of return. However, there are reasons to believe this can be an 
underestimation of these costs. To compensate for this factor, we use the lower-bound estimates 
of these elasticities to compensate for the possibilities of higher costs. Finally, welfare changes 
cannot be directly obtained from WorldScan. However, private consumption is a proxy for 
welfare in WorldScan, since it takes into account the final expenditure possibilities of the   18 
representative household. In the case of R&D expenditures, this is reflected in lower 
consumption levels due to the high subsidies that are necessary to increase R&D levels, which 
in the end are paid by the households. 
In Table 4.1 we summarize the four spillover mechanisms present in WorldScan. When the 
home country is implementing a policy reform that results in a positive production shock, its 
private consumption (used as a proxy for welfare) directly increases.  However, through the 
terms of trade channel there will be an indirect decrease in consumption, while the R&D 
mechanism provides an indirect increase (column 1). When the foreign country is passive while 
the home country is acting (column 2), then the foreign country experiences positive spillovers 
associated with terms of trade gains, an increase in export demand and R&D spillovers; but a 
negative impact through the capital market. Accordingly, the results for both countries acting 
together are given in column 3, while the type of spillovers for the home country -associated 
with collective action-  are given in the last column.  
Table 4.1  Spillover mechanisms in WorldScan, as expected private consumption changes 
Spillover 
channel 
Changes in (acting) 
home country 
Changes  in (passive) 
foreign country 
Changes if both 
countries act together 
Type of spillover for 
home country 
         
Terms of trade  -   +  0  + 
Export demand  0  +  +  + 
Capital markets  0  -   -   -  
R&D  +  +  ++  + 
 
The scenarios will run until 2040, but we present simulation results for the period until 2025. 
We run the scenarios for a maximum number of economic sectors and regions. Because most of 
the policies are not sector-specific, we concentrate on the national effects for all countries. 
Consequently, this version of the model will be rich in regional detail but less so in sectoral 
detail. The regions and sectors distinguished in this study are based on the GTAP6 database. 
The GTAP6 database contains input-output tables for 87 regions and 57 sectors and bilateral 
trade data connecting these input-output tables.   
We distinguish 23 regions and 10 sectors (see Table 4.2). All EU countries are modelled 
separately, except for Belgium and Luxembourg and the region: RestEU27, which comprises 
the three Baltic States, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, we distinguish the 
United States, Rest OECD, and Rest of the World (ROW). For each region, we distinguish 10 
sectors. These consist of agriculture, energy (primary energy and electricity), four 
manufacturing sectors (high, high-medium, low-medium and low technology) and three 
services sectors (transport, other commercial and other). The last sector is the R&D sector. It 
deviates from the other sectors in the sense that we assume that there is no international trade in 
R&D goods.   19 
Table 4.2  Overview of regions, sectors and production inputs in WorldScan 
Austria  Agriculture  Value added 
Belgium-Luxembourg  Low-tech manufacturing  High-skilled labour 
Czech Republic  Medium low-tech manufacturing  Low-skilled Labour 
Germany  Medium high-tech manufacturing  Capital 
Denmark  High-tech manufacturing  R&D stock 
Spain  Transport services  Fixed factor 
Finland  Other commercial services   
France  Other services (government)  Intermediate goods 
United Kingdom  Energy  Agriculture 
Greece  R&D  Low tech manufacturing 
Hungary    Medium low-tech manufacturing 
Ireland    Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Italy    High-tech manufacturing 
The Netherlands    Transport services 
Poland    Other commercial services 
Portugal    Other services (government) 
Slovakia    Energy 
Slovenia     
Sweden     
     
Rest EU27     
     
United States     
Rest OECD     
Non OECD     
 
4.1  Baseline 
In order to evaluate the impact of the various Lisbon policies, we have developed a baseline in 
which these goals are not implemented. The baseline describes a time path of economic 
development between 2006 and the final year of our simulations, 2040. The differences 
between the policy variant simulation and the baseline represent the effects of implementing the 
Lisbon policy. 
The baseline has to fulfil certain conditions. First, it has to comply with recent economic 
developments. The starting year of our simulations is 2001, because that is the latest year for 
which data are available to calibrate the model. Therefore, the time path between 2001 and 
2006 has to include the accession of the new member states to the internal market. Moreover, 
we expect some catching up of these countries towards the old ones. Second, the baseline has to 
be neutral with respect to the implementation of the policy variants. If we would incorporate a 
large increase in skills or increase in R&D expenditures in the baseline, it would become easier 
to reach the Lisbon targets. This means that we aim at moderate economic growth within the 
EU in the baseline.  
Taking in mind these considerations, our baseline is built upon one of our long-term scenarios 
for Europe. CPB has developed four long-term scenarios of the European economy (Lejour, 
2003). As a starting point for our baseline we chose the Strong Europe scenario.  In this   20 
scenario economic growth in Europe is moderate and markets integrate further, regionally and 
globally. Below we describe some of the characteristics of the baseline. 
4.2  Macroeconomic characteristics of baseline 
Population grows slowly within the EU due to aging. Figure 1 shows that population growth 
declines in time from 0.35% per year to zero. In the Central and Eastern European countries 
population will diminish. The population projections are derived from Eurostat (2002) for the 
EU15 countries and the United Nations (2002) for the other member states.  
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      Source: WorldScan simulation 
 
GDP growth slightly decreases over time due to the decline in population growth. GDP growth 
per capita is more or less constant. Between 2001 and 2005 GDP growth will be targeted on the 
actual numbers of the World Bank (2006). From 2006 onwards we assume a constant growth of 
total factor productivity. This leads to a GDP per capita growth rate within the EU of about 
1.9%.  In most new EU member states on average growth is about 2% points higher. We expect 
that these countries gradually catch up to the welfare level of the older members states. In time 
participation rates decline, because people become older. We assume that participation of the 
various age cohorts remain constant in time. The increase in female labour market participation 
does not offset lower participation due to ageing. Therefore employment growth falls over time,   21 
on average by 0.3% in the EU (see Figure 1). This is mainly caused by the reduction in 
employment in Germany, Italy, Spain and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These 
countries are most affected by population aging. 
Exports grow faster than GDP. This in line with observed developments in trade, on average 
trade grows about twice as fast as GDP. Between 2010 and 2030, export growth is stimulated 
by reduced tariff and non-tariff trade barriers due to assumed successful WTO negotiations and 
a further integration of the internal market. After 2030 market integration is not further 
stimulated. Therefore exports grow less fast.    22   23 
5  Simulating the Lisbon targets  
In this section, we compare the simulation outcomes for the cases that all member states jointly 
achieve the Lisbon target, with respect to the case were a single member state conducts these 
policies unilaterally. With this approach we can assess the benefits from coordination for each 
individual member state. We do this for all four policy targets mentioned above and assess the 
international spillovers associated with the joint policy implementation. We present the 
magnitude and the distribution across member States of the potential spillovers. The following 
section analyses these results and the overall outcome for the EU when it jointly implements the 
Lisbon Strategy. 
5.1  Skills target 
We analyse first the increase in skills within the EU. As noted before, this includes a series of 
reforms that rise human capital levels in Europe. In Table 5.1 we present the effects on output, 
consumption and average wages of the skills target when the policies are jointly implemented 
compared with the case when countries act unilaterally. 
The spillovers related to the joint implementation of this specific Lisbon target is the 
difference between column (2) and column (1) in Table 5.1. In other words, how much more 
GDP is obtained when all 27 member states jointly implement the Lisbon Strategy.  
The impacts of the policy vary significantly between countries, especially in regard to the 
impacts on employment. These impacts depend on the increase in years in education, see table 
3.1, and the increase in the school aged population reduces the labour force available for 
employment. The increase is fully absorbed by the existing labour force. We assume that young 
workers withdrawn from the workforce have half of normal productivity. 
First, the economic effects of these policies are limited to increases of less than 1% in GDP 
and consumption. Only Portugal has a noticeable increase in output of 3% due to this policy. 
Moreover, the changes are proportional to the increase in real average wages that is associated 
with higher levels of human capital. Secondly, spillovers amount also to small effects. Only 
Ireland and Slovenia experience positive increases, while for the rest of the EU the spillover 
effects are negligible. 
It is important to mention here the time-pattern of the policy implications. We have 
presented only the accumulated results between 2006 and 2025. However, for the case of the 
skills target, only well after 2025 is the full policy impact expected to occur. Increasing the 
level of human capital implies that more years of education and training will be required, and 
thus, there will be less working years available. In compensation for the extra training, labour 
will likely increase its returns later on. This dynamic of lower returns in early years and higher 
ones later on, implies that there will be an inter-temporal adjustment in the average returns to 
labour after the policy implementation. Thus, for 2015 the output changes related to the skills   24 
targets are negative for the EU (-0.4%) and not until 2040 are the full effects of a 2.1% in GDP 
present. 
Table 5.1  Implementing the skills target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
           GDP             Consumption           Real average wages 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  0.6    0.5    0.6   
             
Austria  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5 
Czech Republic  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Germany  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6 
Denmark  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Spain  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8 
Finland  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
France  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4 
United Kingdom  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8 
Greece  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.0 
Hungary  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Ireland  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Italy  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
The Netherlands  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Poland  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Portugal  3.0  3.0  2.4  2.4  2.9  2.9 
Slovakia  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3 
Slovenia  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Sweden  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
             
Rest EU27  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
             
Average  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
 
Hence, Table 5.2 shows the accumulated economic results for the skills target from 2006 to 
2040. For this last year, the international spillover effects are on average around 0.1 p.p. while 
these where close to zero in 2025. This is roughly a 3% increase in output and a 6% increase in 
the consumption effects, which are directly associated with the spillovers of a joint EU-wide 
policy.   25 
Table 5.2  Implementing the skills target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2040 
           GDP             Consumption           Real average wages 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  2.1    1.9    2.1   
             
Austria  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.6 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2.4  2.2  2.0  1.9  2.2  2.1 
Czech Republic  2.2  1.9  1.9  1.7  2.0  1.7 
Germany  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.3  2.4  2.4 
Denmark  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6  1.6 
Spain  2.7  2.7  2.4  2.3  2.6  2.6 
Finland  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5 
France  2.0  2.0  1.8  1.7  2.1  2.1 
United Kingdom  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5 
Greece  3.6  3.6  3.0  2.9  3.4  3.4 
Hungary  2.6  2.4  2.3  2.1  2.4  2.2 
Ireland  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.8 
Italy  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.2  2.2 
The Netherlands  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1 
Poland  2.8  2.8  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.6 
Portugal  6.4  6.3  5.4  5.3  6.0  6.0 
Slovakia  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.5  1.8  1.6 
Slovenia  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.9  2.1  1.9 
Sweden  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.2  1.2 
             
Rest EU27  1.9  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.8 
             
Average  2.3  2.2  2.0  1.9  2.2  2.1 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
 
5.2  Administrative burden target 
The economic outcome of less red tape in the EU is presented in Table 5.3. The output and 
consumption increase by 1.9% and 1.8%, respectively, in the EU when the target is jointly 
achieved by all member states. Between countries there is small variance, with only Greece and 
Rest EU27 with gains of 3% or more. The international spillovers for this simulation are on 
average 0.1 p.p. For consumption the results are very similar, with spillovers of 0.2 p.p. on 
average. Concerted action adds about 6% (in GDP terms) to 8% (in consumption terms) to 
unilateral actions.   26 
Table 5.3  Reduction in administrative burden by 25%: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
             GDP                     Consumption 
         
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
         
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
EU27  1.9    1.8   
         
Austria  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.1 
Czech Republic  2.3  1.9  2.1  1.8 
Germany  2.0  1.9  2.0  1.9 
Denmark  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1 
Spain  2.1  2.1  1.9  1.8 
Finland  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.3 
France  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.8 
United Kingdom  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Greece  2.6  2.6  2.3  2.2 
Hungary  3.2  2.9  3.0  2.8 
Ireland  1.4  1.3  1.5  1.3 
Italy  2.3  2.3  2.1  2.1 
The Netherlands  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.7 
Poland  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.2 
Portugal  2.3  2.2  1.9  1.8 
Slovakia  2.9  2.6  2.7  2.3 
Slovenia  2.0  1.8  1.9  1.7 
Sweden  1.2  1.1  1.3  1.2 
         
Rest EU27  3.5  3.4  3.1  3.0 
         
Average  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.8 
         
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
 
5.3  R&D target 
Table 5.4 shows the simulation results when the expenditure share of R&D in total GDP 
reaches 2.7% -on average for the EU. This is the policy implementation that produces the 
largest spillover effects. As a whole, the EU can potentially increase output by 3.3%, while the 
spillovers account for roughly half of these gains. Moreover, in  some of the small countries and 
NMS the output spillovers are even higher than the gains from unilateral action. 
However, these significant spillovers are a direct consequence of the huge increase in R&D 
expenditures required to meet the Lisbon target. In fact, from columns 5 and 6 of Table 5.3 it is 
clear that for most of the countries this target is unrealistic. For example, countries like Ireland, 
The Netherlands and Portugal must almost double their R&D stock by 2025, while other 
member states may even require higher efforts (e.g. Spain, Italy, Poland and Slovakia). Greece 
and Rest EU27, for instance, have to triple and quadruple their R&D stocks, respectively. The 
reduction of the initial target from a 3% to a 2.7% of GDP has not made this task more realistic.   27 
Even in countries with lower requirements (i.e. Germany, United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Finland) the effort seems to be considerable in 2025. Another reason why this target is difficult 
to achieve, is because the economy gradually changes towards a less R&D intensive services 
economy.   
The high costs of subsidising the R&D target can also be observed on the changes in 
consumption. First, consumption increases by around half the GDP rates, implicitly reflecting 
the higher savings needed to finance the required investments in R&D. Secondly, the 
importance of the international spillovers is magnified when looking at consumption levels. 
When the member states act alone, consumption increases on average by less than 1 p.p., while 
acting together results in more than a 2 p.p. rise. 
Table 5.4  Reaching a 2.7% GDP share of R&D expenditures: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
           GDP             Consumption           R&D stocks 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  3.3    1.6    53.6   
             
Austria  3.5  1.9  1.5  0.1  62.4  60.4 
Belgium-Luxembourg  4.1  1.9  1.6  0.0  75.1  70.5 
Czech Republic  2.9  0.9  2.1  0.3  15.3  13.5 
Germany  2.5  1.3  1.3  0.2  28.1  27.1 
Denmark  2.2  0.9  1.0  0.0  28.4  27.0 
Spain  4.1  3.1  2.2  1.2  119.0  116.7 
Finland  2.3  1.1  0.8  - 0.3  42.7  39.3 
France  3.1  1.8  1.2  0.1  58.6  57.4 
United Kingdom  1.9  1.2  0.9  0.3  34.4  33.5 
Greece  4.3  2.9  2.7  1.5  210.6  200.0 
Hungary  4.2  2.2  2.6  0.7  61.7  58.9 
Ireland  3.5  2.3  1.3  0.1  98.0  94.9 
Italy  4.7  3.7  2.1  1.2  140.8  139.2 
The Netherlands  4.2  3.2  1.9  1.0  93.9  90.7 
Poland  4.6  3.8  2.7  1.9  147.7  144.9 
Portugal  4.2  2.0  2.5  0.7  90.9  86.2 
Slovakia  5.7  2.6  4.4  1.5  106.2  100.7 
Slovenia  4.2  1.5  2.5  0.3  34.3  31.3 
Sweden  2.3  1.0  0.8  - 0.4  41.3  40.1 
             
Rest EU27  11.1  8.8  8.2  6.4  323.6  314.6 
             
Average  4.0  2.4  2.2  0.8  90.7  87.3 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
 
   28 
Regardless of the practical difficulties in attaining this particular Lisbon target, an increase in 
R&D has the greatest potential for spillover effects within the EU. To analyse the impact of an 
expenditure increase that is more likely to occur, in Table 5.5 we present the results of a 20% 
increase from the 2010 baseline levels for all countries. With this simulation we obtain an 
homogenous increase across countries -in contrast to the country-specific targets analysed 
before, and we also simulate the effects of a moderate shock, instead of the extreme situation 
needed to reach the 2.7% target. 
Table 5.5  20% increase of R&D expenditures: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
           GDP             Consumption           R&D stocks 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  1.4    0.6    25.0   
             
Austria  1.6  0.8  0.8  0.1  23.2  22.4 
Belgium-Luxembourg  1.7  0.7  0.8  0.0  23.9  22.5 
Czech Republic  1.1  0.2  0.9  0.1  1.8  1.0 
Germany  1.6  1.1  0.6  0.2  24.9  24.5 
Denmark  1.4  0.8  0.5  0.0  23.5  22.8 
Spain  1.3  0.8  0.8  0.4  24.1  23.5 
Finland  1.3  0.8  0.3  - 0.2  29.1  27.2 
France  1.7  1.2  0.6  0.1  35.3  34.9 
United Kingdom  1.0  0.7  0.4  0.2  17.0  16.6 
Greece  1.2  0.7  0.8  0.4  26.6  30.0 
Hungary  1.3  0.6  0.9  0.2  12.6  11.7 
Ireland  1.1  0.5  0.7  0.1  13.8  12.7 
Italy  1.5  1.1  0.9  0.5  31.3  30.8 
The Netherlands  1.4  0.9  0.8  0.4  23.1  22.2 
Poland  1.2  0.8  0.8  0.5  21.9  21.2 
Portugal  1.5  0.6  1.0  0.3  21.4  20.5 
Slovakia  2.4  1.6  1.8  1.0  38.7  56.0 
Slovenia  1.2  0.1  0.9  0.1  1.0  - 0.1 
Sweden  1.4  0.7  0.3  - 0.3  29.0  28.5 
             
Rest EU27  2.3  1.5  1.8  1.1  30.2  30.1 
             
Average  1.5  0.8  0.8  0.3  22.6  23.0 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025.  Averages in last row  
are not weighted. 
 
As expected, the magnitude of the effects is smaller and the variation between countries is also 
diminished in this simulation. Output increases by 1.4% in the EU, while consumption raises 
0.6%. These figures make the economic effects of the R&D target comparable in scale to those 
of the skills and administrative burden targets. 
The R&D stocks increase now by a more realistic 25% in average, although with some country 
variation. For the case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, R&D stocks barely increase   29 
because in the baseline both countries where already experiencing significant increases in their 
R&D expenditures. This lower than average increase in R&D stocks was also present in the 
previous experiment (see Table 5.4). 
However, even when the overall impact of the policy is greatly diminished, the large 
international spillovers associated with R&D expenditures are still present. Again, output 
spillovers nearly double the unilateral outcomes, and for many small and NMS countries the 
spillovers are even higher. Moreover, the consumption spillovers are even more important, and 
almost triple the results from unilateral action.  
Therefore, using more realistic expenditure increases does reduce the magnitude of the 
overall consumption and output effects, but the spillovers associated with R&D expenditure 
increases remain substantial. 
5.4  Employment target 
Table 5.6 shows the effects on GDP and consumption of implementing the target; as well as the 
employment increase necessary to achieve 70% employment in each individual country.
6 For 
the EU as a whole, the joint implementation will represent an increase in GDP of 7.0%.  For 
individual countries GDP changes are in a wide range (14.9% in Hungary and 0.2% in 
Denmark).  
These changes are proportional to the required employment changes necessary to achieve 
the 70% target. Clearly, the countries required to make the greatest employment increases (e.g. 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Greece, Hungary, France, Italy and the NMS), obtain the largest GDP 
and consumption gains. 
For much of the countries, the spillovers associated with joint action add less than 0.5 p.p. of 
extra GDP. Only Slovakia has output spillovers that exceed 1 p.p. On average for the EU27, the 
spillovers represent around a 0.3 p.p. addition of output and 0.4 p.p. of consumption. This 
represents roughly around a 5% output increase and a 9% consumption increase from the gains 
of unilateral reform.  
Achieving the 70% employment target yields the highest GDP and consumption gains from 
any other target. However, the spillovers are modest and still, the most important channel is 
given by R&D stocks. By the increase in GDP caused by higher employment, R&D 
expenditures increase as well, and the output of these extra expenditures spill over to the other 
member states through trade.  
 
 
6 Note that the 70% target is an EU average. Thus, some individual countries will be above this level and others below.    30 
Table 5.6  Reaching the 70% employment target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
           GDP           Consumption           Employment 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  7.0    6.4    8.5   
             
Austria  4.4  3.8  4.3  3.4  4.9  4.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg  14.8  14.4  12.7  12.3  17.2  17.2 
Czech Republic  6.8  5.9  6.1  5.3  6.1  6.1 
Germany  4.4  4.2  4.3  4.1  4.9  4.9 
Denmark  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.2 
Spain  6.7  6.7  5.9  5.7  7.4  7.4 
Finland  4.5  4.6  4.8  4.7  5.4  5.4 
France  9.9  9.8  9.0  8.8  11.5  11.5 
United Kingdom  3.1  3.1  3.0  2.8  3.2  3.2 
Greece  11.2  11.1  9.4  9.2  11.6  11.6 
Hungary  14.9  14.2  13.9  13.2  16.2  16.2 
Ireland  4.7  4.3  4.7  4.3  5.2  5.2 
Italy  14.2  14.2  12.7  12.6  17.3  17.3 
The Netherlands  1.4  1.2  1.5  1.1  1.5  1.5 
Poland  14.7  14.7  13.1  13.0  14.7  14.7 
Portugal  5.3  5.0  4.4  4.1  4.9  4.9 
Slovakia  10.6  9.5  9.6  8.1  10.3  10.3 
Slovenia  8.6  7.9  8.0  7.3  8.4  8.4 
Sweden  2.2  2.0  2.3  2.1  2.2  2.2 
             
Rest EU27  13.2  13.1  11.3  11.1  12.1  12.1 
             
Average  7.8  7.5  7.1  6.7  8.3  8.2 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025.  Averages in last row  
are not weighted. 
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6  The benefits of the EU acting together 
In this section, we first analyse the previous results and identify the main channels through 
which the international spillovers are associated with the Lisbon policies. Finally, in Section 6.2 
we present the simulation results when all four targets are simultaneously implemented. 
6.1  Assessing the importance of the spillover channels 
The first observation is that none of the Lisbon policies results in negative international 
spillovers within the EU. It is useful to recall the main channels through which policies spill 
over within the analytical CGE framework of WorldScan: terms of trade, exports, capital 
markets and R&D spillovers. Of these channels only the capital markets and terms of trade 
effects can cause negative spillovers. However, both effects are relatively small and the 
dominating channel is R&D expenditures.  
From additional material (Lejour and Tang, 2004), we know that terms of trade effects are 
usually small in WorldScan. From the table in the appendix, we observe that the spillovers 
associated with this channel are also small and the sign of the effect is usually negative. For the 
first two targets: less red tape and skills, the spillovers are close to zero. For the R&D and 
employment targets the spillovers associated with the terms of trade channel are negative. 
However, the effects are still very small. 
The export spillover, on the other hand, is always positive. In the appendix we present the 
changes in exports associated with the implementation of each Lisbon policy. For the R&D and 
employment target the effect is substantial and higher when the EU acts jointly.  
With respect to the interest rate channel, the effects are not significant for all target 
simulations (see appendix). Not only are the overall interest rate effects small, but there are 
barely any changes when jointly implementing the Lisbon policies 
Finally, the appendix reports the changes in the R&D stock related with each Lisbon policy 
target. As expected, for the R&D target the R&D stock is changing the most and the spillover 
effect is also positive. This is a result of both the high R&D expenditures needed to meet the 
Lisbon target and the positive spillovers directly modelled into WorldScan, i.e., that the stock 
level of R&D in neighbouring countries directly affects productivity in the home country.  
Since the R&D channel is directly modelled into WorldScan, we can simply ‘switch off’ this 
specific effects. In additional simulations (not reported here), we run the Lisbon target 
simulations when the elasticity of the home productivity with respect to the foreign R&D stock 
is equal to zero. In these simulations, most of the international spillover effects are lost. This 
results highlight the fact that the other three spillover channels: terms of trade, exports and 
interest rates have relatively small overall impacts. 
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A first conclusion following the analysis of the spillover channels is that the R&D effect 
dominates the other three. This is a result of the interest rate and terms of trade spillover effect 
being small for most simulations. The exports channel, on the other hand may produce higher 
spillover effects, but in general, the positive spillovers associated with all four simulations are 
highly correlated to positive R&D spillover effects. This is particularly clear for the case when 
the R&D target is implemented, but it also applies in the remaining three policy simulations. It 
is important to remember, however, that the R&D targets are highly ambitious.  Therefore, the 
large expected output increase of implementing this target is not probable to occur.  
 
To sum up, the 70% employment target achieves the highest increase in output and 
consumption, but the R&D target is the main channel through which domestic reforms spillover 
to other economies. Thus, the coordination of R&D policies within the EU has the greatest 
potential for cooperation (see also Ederveen et al. 2005), but also the greatest possibility of 
reducing private sector saving because of the increase in government spending it induces.  
6.2  Combined implementation of the four targets 
The Lisbon programme is about putting a package together to raise output and employment, and 
the combination of the skills and employment package, R&D expenditure increases and 
reductions in administrative burdens will do that. In Table 6.1 we present the WorldScan results 
of the overall impact on GDP and consumption of reaching the four targets simultaneously by 
all EU27 member states, against the sum of the results of implementing the individual targets 
separately.  
These results provide information on the synergies between the different policies. In the 
context of WorldScan, this accounts for the increased R&D expenditure associated with higher 
levels of GDP attained by reaching the other Lisbon targets. In turn, the additional R&D stocks 
create national and international spillover effects for the member states.  
In particular, for the EU27 this particular synergy channel represents an extra 0.4 p.p. 
increase in output and 0.3 p.p. of consumption. While for some member states (e.g. Belgium-
Luxembourg, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and the Rest EU27) the simultaneous 
application of the four targets increases output by 1 p.p. or more.   33 
Table 6.1  Reaching the four targets simultaneously and cumulative effects, 2006-2025 
              GDP               Consumption 
         
Reaching targets:  Simultaneously  Sum of individual 
results 
Simultaneously  Sum of individual 
results 
         
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
EU27  13.2  12.8  10.6  10.3 
         
Austria  10.4  10.4  7.8  8.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg  22.0  21.0  16.6  16.1 
Czech Republic  12.6  12.3  10.7  10.5 
Germany  9.7  9.5  8.3  8.1 
Denmark  4.3  4.2  3.1  3.1 
Spain  14.3  13.7  10.9  10.7 
Finland  8.7  8.3  7.1  7.1 
France  15.9  15.4  12.8  12.4 
United Kingdom  7.1  7.0  5.8  5.7 
Greece  20.0  19.1  15.8  15.2 
Hungary  24.2  22.7  20.8  19.8 
Ireland  10.4  10.1  8.1  7.9 
Italy  22.8  21.8  18.1  17.4 
The Netherlands  8.1  7.8  5.6  5.5 
Poland  23.6  22.4  19.4  18.6 
Portugal  15.4  14.8  11.7  11.2 
Slovakia  20.6  19.5  17.8  16.9 
Slovenia  15.7  15.3  13.1  12.8 
Sweden  6.3  6.1  4.8  4.8 
         
Rest EU27  29.9  27.9  24.2  22.7 
         
Average  15.1  14.5  12.1  11.7 
         
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025.  Averages in last row  
are not weighted. 
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7  Conclusions 
The Lisbon strategy is an ambitious agenda to increase employment and growth in the EU. 
From a policy perspective, it is interesting to know if the joint implementation of these reforms 
produces different results if compared with the case where individual member states reform 
unilaterally. Put differently, are there positive international spillovers associated with the 
implementation of the Lisbon strategy within the EU? 
Simulating four of the Lisbon policies in the CGE model WorldScan, we conclude that 
indeed, there are potential gains from implementing these reforms jointly across the EU. In 
particular, the R&D target has the greatest spillover potential, with GDP roughly doubling in 
the EU when the target is jointly implemented. For the other three targets analysed employment, 
skills and administrative burden the associated spillovers are less significant and only represent 
an additional increase in output and consumption of around 6% or less, compared to the case 
where the reforms are unilaterally implemented in each member state. This suggests that the 
existence of spillovers is not an argument of coordinating these policies in Europe.  
Even in these three targets, the main channel through which spillovers are created is the 
increase in the R&D stock.  Following the influential conclusions found by Coe and Helpman 
(1995), WorldScan directly links the R&D stock of neighbouring countries to increases in 
domestic TFP. Thus, our results are not surprising. However, the scale of the effect and its 
quantification provides important information. First, the R&D effect outweighs other potential 
spillover channels, such as terms of trade effects, capital market effects and increases in export 
demand. It also provides policy-makers with an estimation of the potential gains associated with 
a sharp increase in R&D expenditures. These estimates are based on conservative rates of return 
on R&D and on the assumption that these rates of return remain constant even if the targeted 
increase in R&D spending is substantial. 
The combination of all four policies do not deliver much extra economic gains in terms of 
GDP and employment above the economic effects of the separate policies. However, not all 
possible synergies such as the supply of R&D workers (skills target) and the R&D target are 
modelled. 
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Appendix 
Upper-bound estimations for all four targets 
Implementing the skills target: joint and unilateral results, upper bound simulations, 2006-2040 
           GDP           Consumption           Real average wages 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  2.3    2.1    2.2   
             
Austria  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.4  1.8  1.6 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2.5  2.3  2.2  1.9  2.4  2.1 
Czech Republic  2.6  2.0  2.2  1.7  2.3  1.8 
Germany  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.6  2.5 
Denmark  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.7 
Spain  3.0  2.9  2.6  2.4  2.8  2.7 
Finland  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.6 
France  2.2  2.1  1.9  1.8  2.3  2.2 
United Kingdom  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.5 
Greece  3.8  3.7  3.2  3.1  3.6  3.5 
Hungary  2.9  2.5  2.5  2.2  2.6  2.3 
Ireland  2.0  1.7  1.9  1.6  2.0  1.8 
Italy  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.4  2.3 
The Netherlands  1.3  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.1 
Poland  3.0  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.8  2.7 
Portugal  6.9  6.6  5.7  5.5  6.5  6.2 
Slovakia  2.2  1.8  2.1  1.6  2.1  1.7 
Slovenia  2.5  2.1  2.3  1.9  2.3  2.0 
Sweden  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.3  1.2 
             
Rest EU27  2.2  2.0  1.9  1.7  2.0  1.9 
             
Average  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.0  2.4  2.2 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. We use the upper 
bound full TFP elasticities with respect to R&D stocks. Averages in last row are not weighted. 
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Reduction in administrative burden by 25%: joint and unilateral results, upper bound simulations, 2006-2025 
                   GDP                   Consumption 
         
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
         
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
EU27  2.1    2.0   
         
Austria  2.6  2.3  2.4  2.1 
Belgium-Luxembourg  1.7  1.3  1.5  1.2 
Czech Republic  2.8  2.0  2.5  1.9 
Germany  2.2  2.0  2.2  2.0 
Denmark  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.2 
Spain  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.4 
Finland  2.2  2.1  2.1  1.9 
France  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1 
United Kingdom  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.3 
Greece  3.7  3.1  3.4  2.9 
Hungary  1.7  1.3  1.7  1.4 
Ireland  2.5  2.4  2.3  2.2 
Italy  2.1  1.9  1.9  1.7 
The Netherlands  2.8  2.6  2.6  2.4 
Poland  2.6  2.3  2.2  1.9 
Portugal  3.5  2.7  3.2  2.4 
Slovakia  2.4  1.8  2.3  1.8 
Slovenia  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.0 
Sweden  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.2 
         
Rest EU27  4.0  3.8  3.5  3.3 
         
Average  2.4  2.1  2.2  1.9 
         
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. We use the upper 
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Reaching a 2.7% GDP share of R&D expenditures: joint and unilateral results, upper bound simulations, 
2006-2025 
          GDP          Consumption          R&D stocks 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  11.0    8.3    60.1   
             
Austria  11.1  4.3  8.1  2.2  70.5  64.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  12.8  3.7  8.3  1.5  86.7  73.9 
Czech Republic  15.8  2.0  12.8  1.4  18.8  14.4 
Germany  8.2  2.9  6.7  1.7  31.8  28.1 
Denmark  7.1  2.1  5.4  1.0  30.6  26.6 
Spain  13.7  9.1  10.1  6.2  130.3  123.6 
Finland  6.7  2.3  4.8  0.8  38.9  37.7 
France  9.8  4.8  7.3  2.9  64.4  60.2 
United Kingdom  6.0  3.0  4.5  1.8  39.1  36.3 
Greece  19.3  13.4  15.1  10.1  260.6  245.0 
Hungary  18.9  6.6  14.8  4.6  71.8  64.6 
Ireland  13.4  6.1  9.7  3.6  109.0  100.8 
Italy  14.5  10.0  10.4  6.5  154.6  148.6 
The Netherlands  11.1  5.8  8.1  3.4  104.6  94.9 
Poland  17.8  4.4  13.9  3.0  162.4  45.9 
Portugal  15.2  7.2  11.3  4.9  104.5  96.7 
Slovakia  33.8  20.1  26.6  15.1  364.3  337.1 
Slovenia  16.4  3.5  13.0  2.3  40.8  34.0 
Sweden  7.5  2.3  5.5  0.8  47.0  43.0 
             
Rest EU27  47.8  38.1  38.8  30.7  387.4  379.7 
             
Average  15.3  7.6  11.8  5.2  115.9  102.7 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. We use the upper 
bound full TFP elasticities with respect to R&D stocks. Averages in last row are not weighted. 
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Reaching the 70% employment target: joint and unilateral results, upper bound simulations, 2006-2025 
          GDP          Consumption          Employment 
             
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
             
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
EU27  8.1    7.4    9.8   
             
Austria  4.4  3.8  4.1  3.5  4.2  4.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg  15.0  14.3  12.9  12.2  17.2  17.2 
Czech Republic  9.2  7.2  8.2  6.5  7.5  7.5 
Germany  5.9  5.5  5.8  5.3  6.2  6.2 
Denmark  0.1  - 0.2  0.2  - 0.2  - 0.2  - 0.2 
Spain  9.3  9.1  8.1  7.7  9.8  9.8 
Finland  6.0  5.9  6.2  5.9  6.6  6.6 
France  10.5  10.1  9.5  9.1  11.7  11.7 
United Kingdom  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.6  2.6 
Greece  13.5  13.3  11.4  11.1  13.6  13.6 
Hungary  14.2  12.7  13.1  11.8  14.5  14.5 
Ireland  5.0  4.4  5.0  4.4  5.3  5.3 
Italy  15.9  15.8  14.3  14.0  18.8  18.8 
The Netherlands  2.3  1.8  2.3  1.7  2.2  2.2 
Poland  23.3  23.1  20.7  20.4  22.2  22.0 
Portugal  4.6  3.9  3.9  3.2  3.8  3.8 
Slovakia  18.2  15.9  16.2  13.6  16.8  16.8 
Slovenia  9.8  8.3  9.1  7.8  8.7  8.7 
Sweden  1.7  1.4  1.8  1.4  1.5  1.5 
             
Rest EU27  16.5  16.1  14.1  13.6  14.5  14.5 
             
Average  9.4  8.7  8.5  7.8  9.4  9.4 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. We use the upper 
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Analysing the main spillover channels 
Terms of trade changes for each Lisbon target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
Target     Skills   Administrative burden         R&D     Employment 
                 
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
                 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
EU27  0.0    0.0    - 0.4    - 0.2   
                 
Austria  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.5  - 0.6  - 0.1  - 0.1 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.6  - 0.6  - 0.4  - 0.4 
Czech Republic  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.5  - 0.1  - 0.2  - 0.2 
Germany  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.3  - 0.1  - 0.1 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.2  0.1  0.0 
Spain  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.5  - 0.2  - 0.3 
Finland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.5  - 0.6  0.0  0.0 
France  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.4  - 0.3  - 0.3 
United Kingdom  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.3  - 0.4  0.0  - 0.1 
Greece  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.2  - 0.1  - 0.5  - 0.6 
Hungary  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.3  - 0.3  - 0.3 
Ireland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.6  - 0.4  0.0  0.0 
Italy  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.6  - 0.7  - 0.5  - 0.5 
The Netherlands  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.6  - 0.8  0.2  0.0 
Poland  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.4  - 0.7  - 0.8  - 0.8 
Portugal  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.2  - 0.2  - 0.1  - 0.1 
Slovakia  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  0.3  - 0.3  0.1  - 0.4 
Slovenia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.5  - 0.3  - 0.2  - 0.1 
Sweden  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  - 0.3  - 0.4  0.0  0.0 
                 
Rest EU27  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.3  - 0.5  - 0.5  - 0.5 
                 
Average  0.0  0.0  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.3  - 0.4  - 0.2  - 0.2 
                 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
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Export changes for each Lisbon target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
Target     Skills  Administrative burden      R&D     Employment 
                 
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
                 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
EU27  0.5    1.6    5.6    6.6   
                 
Austria  0.3  0.3  2.1  1.7  7.2  5.9  4.2  3.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.6  0.5  1.5  1.0  7.8  5.6  13.9  12.6 
Czech Republic  0.3  0.2  2.3  1.3  3.1  1.5  7.2  3.9 
Germany  0.5  0.5  1.6  1.2  4.4  3.3  4.2  2.7 
Denmark  0.5  0.4  1.0  0.7  2.8  1.8  0.7  0.1 
Spain  0.9  0.8  1.9  1.5  6.4  5.0  6.6  5.4 
Finland  0.1  0.1  1.1  0.7  9.0  7.0  3.1  2.3 
France  0.4  0.4  1.7  1.4  5.2  3.5  8.5  7.1 
United Kingdom  0.6  0.6  1.0  0.7  4.5  3.8  3.2  2.1 
Greece  0.9  0.9  2.1  1.8  1.9  0.0  9.2  8.0 
Hungary  0.4  0.3  2.9  2.1  5.9  4.4  12.8  10.0 
Ireland  0.3  0.1  1.2  0.6  6.9  5.8  4.5  2.8 
Italy  0.6  0.5  1.9  1.6  6.7  5.2  11.9  10.8 
The Netherlands  0.3  0.3  1.4  1.2  7.7  6.8  1.8  0.9 
Poland  0.6  0.6  2.4  1.9  6.2  5.8  13.6  11.8 
Portugal  2.6  2.4  2.1  1.6  5.3  1.6  5.6  3.9 
Slovakia  0.3  0.2  2.4  1.7  5.5  2.5  9.0  6.4 
Slovenia  0.4  0.3  1.9  1.1  6.1  3.2  8.1  5.1 
Sweden  0.3  0.2  1.0  0.7  5.1  3.4  2.2  1.3 
                 
Rest EU27  0.1  0.1  2.5  2.1  9.1  4.4  9.6  8.2 
                 
Average  0.6  0.5  1.8  1.3  5.8  4.0  7.0  5.4 
                 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2040. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
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Real interest rates changes for each Lisbon target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
Target     Skills     Administrative burden     R&D    Employment 
                 
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
                 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
EU27  0.0    0.1    0.1    0.2   
                 
Austria  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.3 
Czech Republic  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2 
Germany  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Spain  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2 
Finland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
France  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3 
United Kingdom  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Greece  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2 
Hungary  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.4 
Ireland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Italy  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.4 
The Netherlands  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Poland  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.5 
Portugal  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Slovakia  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.3 
Slovenia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2 
Sweden  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0 
                 
Rest EU27  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.5 
                 
Average  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2 
                 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
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Table 7.1  Changes in the R&D stock for each Lisbon target: joint and unilateral results, 2006-2025 
Target     Skills     Administrative burden     R&D         Employment 
                 
Acting  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone  Together  Alone 
                 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
EU27  0.6    1.7    53.6    3.2   
                 
Austria  0.3  0.3  2.2  2.1  62.4  60.4  1.9  1.6 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.6  0.5  1.5  1.0  75.1  70.5  5.7  3.5 
Czech Republic  0.2  0.2  2.1  1.6  15.3  13.5  3.6  2.0 
Germany  0.5  0.6  1.7  1.6  28.1  27.1  1.9  1.3 
Denmark  0.6  0.6  1.1  1.1  28.4  27.0  0.0  0.1 
Spain  1.1  1.2  2.3  2.4  119.0  116.7  4.8  4.8 
Finland  0.2  0.1  1.1  0.8  42.7  39.3  - 0.3  - 1.3 
France  0.6  0.7  2.3  2.5  58.6  57.4  6.6  6.6 
United Kingdom  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.0  34.4  33.5  1.6  1.5 
Greece  1.1  1.3  2.4  2.9  210.6  200.0  7.4  9.1 
Hungary  0.3  0.3  2.9  2.4  61.7  58.9  5.9  4.3 
Ireland  0.2  0.0  1.1  0.7  98.0  94.9  2.2  0.7 
Italy  0.8  0.9  2.7  2.9  140.8  139.2  9.7  9.8 
The Netherlands  0.2  0.3  1.7  1.7  93.9  90.7  0.7  0.4 
Poland  0.6  0.6  2.5  2.5  147.7  144.9  8.2  7.8 
Portugal  3.2  3.4  2.1  2.3  90.9  86.2  3.2  3.7 
Slovakia  0.2  0.3  2.3  2.5  106.2  100.7  3.5  4.5 
Slovenia  0.3  0.3  1.8  1.4  34.3  31.3  4.4  2.6 
Sweden  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.8  41.3  40.1  0.3  0.3 
                 
Rest EU27  0.1  0.2  3.2  3.6  323.6  314.6  7.2  8.2 
                 
Average  0.6  0.6  1.9  1.9  90.7  87.3  3.9  3.6 
                 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes from the baseline simulations in the year 2025. Averages in last row 
are not weighted. 
 
 